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WI-FI TRACKING SYSTEMS
I Wi-Fi-enabled smartphones frequently emit frames because they scan for access points
I Each frame contains a unique identifier of the device: the MAC address
I Wi-Fi tracking systems monitor and store these frames in order to make statistics:
I number of visitors
I frequency of visits
I travel paths
I etc.
PRIVACY ISSUES
I Lot of private information stored - much more than needed to make basic statistics
I Anyone with access - legitimate or not - to that data can get a lot of information about
passers-by
I In France, made illegal by the “Informatique et Liberté” law (LIL). The CNIL made precise
recommandations for this case of information collecting so that one knows if they respect the
law [1]:
I Data must be deleted when the person exits the place
I Used algorithm must ensure a strong collision rate, i.e. an identifier must correspond to several people
I People must give their explicit consent it if one wants to store data for a longer period (opt-in system).
I We can work on storing only information valuable for statistics
I There is no miracle solution
I We aim to propose a privacy/utility tradeoff
OBJECTIVES
I Short term:
I First, comparing the different methods
I Finding a good privacy metric
I Long term:
I Having a ready-to-use system with the same functionalities than existing Wi-Fi tracking systems, augmented
with privacy-by-design
DATA COLLECTION
I We need datasets to perform all our tests, containing logs of raw MAC addresses seen at a
certain time at a certain place.
I Legislation forbids the collection of such datasets, as they contain personal identifiers
I Need consent of all concerned people
I difficult to set up
I Possible solutions:
I getting the consent of concerned people (one try at ACM Middleware, small dataset obtained)
I generate synthetic datasets from models
PRIVACY METRICS
I We need metrics to quantify “privacy”, in order to evaluate our methods
I Possible metrics are (non-exhaustive list):
I K-anonymity
I Collision rate: how many devices may be identified by the same identifier?
I entropy?
I Other considerations:
I Is the collision rate evenly distributed?
I What happens on extreme values? (e.g. very few number of passers-by)
I We have to determine which one (among these ones or other ones) best fits ours needs
HASHING
I Principle: Using a simple cryptographic hash function, such as MD5 or functions of the SHA
family, with no salt
I Problems:
I Easy to reverse in the case of MAC addresses [2]
I Almost no collision
I Almost useless
HASHING AND TRONCATION
I Principle: Same as hashing, but only keep a small part of the result
I the less you keep, the more collisions you’ll get
I Also possible to troncate before hashing, in order to manually increase collision rate (first 3
bytes of the MAC address are the constructor identifier)
I Problem: Still easy to reverse?
BITMAPS
I Principle: logarithmic repartition of the hashes [4]
I Problems:
I Unequal collision probability (half MAC addresses will set first bit ot one while only one will set the last bast to
one)
I Very approximate for low numbers of MAC addresses (which is our case most of the time)
BLOOM FILTERS
I Data structure useful for many applications
I Insertion and search in O(1)
I ...but false positives
I ...which we use for privacy purpose
I We aim to be able to say that a person may have been here, but never be sure about it
I Principle: about the same as bitmaps, but use several hashing functions spreading bits
uniformly on the array of bits
aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff
00 0 0 00 0 0 00 0011111 1Bloom filter
gives the approximate number of visitors
(with m length of the filter,
k number of hash functions,
X number of ones) [3]
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 m...
h1()h2() h3() hash functions give index number
10 1
I Problems:
I It may be possible to know for sure that some MAC addresses were seen
I May still give bad results for low numbers of MAC addresses (tests ongoing)
OTHER POSSIBILITIES
I Using other phone characterisitics instead of MAC addresses (plenty of fingerprinting
techniques exist) [5]
I Hashing with salts (keys), and destroying keys after a predefined period of time. Key
destruction is not a trivial problem.
DEPLOYMENT
I Simple tools: raspberry pis with Wi-Fi dongles
I Partnership with UrbaLyon
I Searching for partners with an infrastructure to share (electricity + network access)
FUNDING
I Project founded by Academic Research Community (ARC), Rhône-Alpes region (ARC 7).
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